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AYNSLEY KELLOW*

The Dispute over the Franklin
River and South West Wilderness
Area in Tasmania, Australia
INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1983 the High Court of Australia upheld the constitutional
validity of the 1983 World Heritage Properties Act [19831,' a statute
which halted construction of a hydro-electric power scheme in the area
of wilderness in the southwest of Tasmania. The decision was notable
both because it represented an extension of Commonwealth power within
the Australian federation and because of the fact that it preserved an
important area of temperate wilderness. The focus of this paper is on the
latter aspect.
The High Court ruling was the final stage in a long and bitter struggle
between those who wished to see development in the South West and
those who wished to preserve the area further from such encroachments.
While the focus of the dispute was the dam proposal, also at stake were
the forest and potential mineral resources of the area. The successful
campaign by the preservationists-the Tasmanian Wilderness Societyinvolved both extensive lobbying of politicians and bureaucrats at both
the state and Commonwealth levels and direct, non-violent protest action,
including a much-publicized blockade of the dam site once construction
commenced. The conflict over the.development of the South West strained
the Tasmanian political system to the breaking point. It resulted in a yearlong deadlock between the two houses of the Tasmanian legislature; a
referendum aimed at resolving the deadlock saw one-third of the ballots
cast spoiled as an act of protest; a Cabinet minister was sacked over the
issue; the governing party was forced to an early election (an election it
lost) after losing a confidence motion because of the issue; action by the
Commonwealth government to protect the area placed the Australian
federation under stress. 2
The halting of construction of the hydro scheme and the preservation
of the South West wilderness was an important victory for the conservation
movement in Australia, and, indeed, for the cause ofwilderness preservation worldwide. After all, if an affluent nation such as Australia was
*Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia.
1. World Heritage Properties Act of 1983, No. 5 (Austrl. 1983).
2. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 46 A.LR. 625 (1983).
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not prepared to set aside areas of relatively pristine wilderness for posterity, the case for less affluent nations to do the same would be severely
undermined. Nevertheless, the degree of strain on the political system
evident in this case highlights the magnitude of the forces which can be
mobilized by wilderness preservation issues, and calls into question the
ability of political institutions to resolve them at all-let alone resolve
them so as to result in wilderness preservation. This was a classic development versus preservation battle, with exploitation of the state's
hydroelectric resources being seen by many Tasmanians as necessary to
the economic well-being of the state, and wilderness preservation as an
unaffordable luxury. These were political factors which could not be
overcome within the state despite a vigorous, well-organized campaign
which struck a responsive chord with a broad spectrum of Tasmanian
society. The Franklin River was saved only because of a successful campaign at the national level, and even then the victory must be regarded
as fortunate, relying as it did upon an extension of Commonwealth powers
which occurred principally as a result of this case.
While the case therefore illustrates a successful campaign to protect a
wilderness area, it also draws attention to many of the problems which
must be overcome by all advocates of wilderness preservation and reminds
us just how difficult a task this can prove to be. These difficulties relate
especially to the nature of the benefits and costs involved in development
versus wilderness issues, and the implications these have for the representation of various interests in the policy process. The Franklin case
highlights the point that interests pushing for development are often already incorporated into social institutions-or the "regime" governing
natural resources. 3 Pro-development values (and, indeed, values which
favor one kind of development over another) can be deeply embedded
and find expression in implicit or explicit assumptions which bias the
information available to policymakers. Wilderness preservation is thus a
cause which must be fought in a reactive rather than pro-active manner,
and fought against powerful, institutionalized interests. Moreover, wilderness tends to be a "lumpy" good, so that an area must be preserved
in toto rather than the compromise of limited development within the area
being possible. Compromise solutions are thus not readily attainable,
save compromises which involve long-term costs which must be weighed
against the immediate gains (in this case, the costs of the entrenchment
in office in Tasmania of a government with values hostile to the environmental cause).

3. 0. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES passim (1982),
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The Case History
It is difficult to state precisely when the conflict over the Franklin and
Lower Gordon Rivers in the South West wilderness area of Tasmania
began. The report recommending a dam on the Gordon River below its
confluence with the Franklin was produced in October 1979, but the
conflict goes back at least as far as a similar conflict over the Gordon
Stage One project in the late 1960s and early 1970s.4 This earlier scheme
involved the inundation of beautiful Lake Pedder, regarded by many as
the jewel of the South West.
Even this initial conflict over the exploitation of the South West wilderness had its roots in earlier times, however. For example, the faith in
the ability of cheap hydro-electric power to provide economic riches for
a marginal state with a marginal economy (which underlay both these
controversies) dated back at least to the 1930s. This policy (known as
"hydro-industrialization") underpinned the perceived necessity for all
power development projects in Tasmania, because two-thirds of electricity
generated was sold to energy-intensive industries-principally pulp and
paper production and metallurgical processing (aluminium, ferromanganese and zinc).' In terms of a more specific starting date for the
Gordon Below Franklin project, we can point to initial survey work in
the South West being commenced by the state Hydro-electric Commission
(HEC) in 1948-49.
The Hydro-electric Commission of Tasmania is a semi-autonomous
public corporation which traditionally has enjoyed such a degree of autonomy that the prefix "semi" would be regarded by many as inaccurate.
The HEC was deliberately insulated from political interference by its
enabling statute, so that while the state government guaranteed its debt,
it had little control over its day-to-day affairs. 6 It had to obtain parliamentary approval for new construction projects, but since this meant both
houses of parliament (including an upper house, the Legislative Council,
which was not organized on party lines) the government (formed by the
majority party in the lower house, the House of Assembly) was never
really in command of the HEC. The Minister in Charge of the Hydroelectric Commission was answerable in the House for its actions, but the
4. See Davis, Waterpower and Wilderness: PoliticalandAdministrativeAspects of the Lake Pedder
Controversy. 31 Aust. J. PuB. ADMIN. 21 passim (1972).
5. For discussion of "hydro-industrialization" and the political economy of Tasmania see P.
THOMPSON, POWER IN TASMANIA (1981); Kellow, ElectricityPlanningin Tasmaniaand New Zealand:
Political Processesand the Technological Imperative, 45 AusT.. J. PuB. ADMIN. 2 (1986); Davis,
Tasmania:The PoliticalEconomy of a PeripheralState, in TIE POLITIcs OF DEVELOPMENT IN AUSTRALIA
(B. Head ed. 1986).
6. See Herr & Davis, The Tasmanian Parliament,Accountability and the Hydro-Electric Commission: The Franklin River Controversy, in PARLIAMENT AND BUREAUCRACY 269-70 (J. Nethercote
ed. 1982).
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HEC was effectively immune from ministerial direction. Moreover, the
HEC was perceived as being an important agency promoting economic
development, both by attracting industry with cheap electricity7 and by
providing jobs in the construction of power schemes.
Despite this traditional support, the political climate confronting the
HEC at the time it commenced investigations into the hydro-electric
potential of the South West was to undergo considerable change by the
late 1970s when it sought parliamentary approval for the Gordon Below
Franklin scheme. In 1950 there was little concern for the natural environment in general or for the largely unexplored South West wilderness
in particular; there was, however, concern over an undersupply of electricity at a time when the product was gaining market penetration because
construction programs had been interrupted by World War 11.
Substantial concern for nature conservation commenced in Tasmania
soon after, however. The Lake Pedder National Park was established in
the South West in 1955, but it was not until 1962 that a coalition of
community groups, the South West Committee, was formed to push
conservation interests in relation to the area. A year later the Commonwealth government provided financial assistance to the Tasmanian government to build a road into the area. It was this road which provided
access for the construction of the Gordon Stage One project, unveiled in
a report to Parliament in 1967, at a time of electricity rationing brought
about because of severe drought. The label "Stage One" clearly signaled
the intention of the HEC to pursue subsequent development of the lower
Gordon River.
There was considerable controversy over the Gordon Stage One project.
Pressure brought to bear by numerous groups resulted in the formation
of a South West National Park in 1968, but few other concessions were
extracted by the conservationists. There was little difference between the
positions of the Liberal and Labour parties on the issue at the level of
state politics, and there was more difference within each of these parties
at the state and federal levels than between the two at either level. This
lack of real choice for voters encouraged the formation of an environmentally-oriented party which is regarded as the first "Greens" party (the
United Tasmania Group) to contest the 1972 state election. The prowilderness forces also formed a nationwide lobby group (the Lake Pedder
Action Group) to press for intervention by the Commonwealth government. With the Tasmanian government being unresponsive to the demands
of the conservationists, the Commonwealth became their last hope, despite the fact that the impoundment which would inundate Lake Pedder
7. The other Australian states must rely primarily on more expensive thermal electricity generation.
For an overview, see G. MCCOLL, THE EcoNoMics OF ELECTRICrrY SUPPLY IN AUSTRALIA (1976).
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was rapidly filling. The Commonwealth, however, lacked effective constitutional power to protect Lake Pedder from the encroaching waters and
it could do little more than establish an inquiry and subsequently offer
full financial compensation to Tasmania to save the lake. The Tasmanian
government declined the offer of compensation and resented the attempt
to meddle in state affairs.'
Thus Lake Pedder was lost and electricity planning within the state
became politicized for the first time. The next power scheme (on the
Pieman River in the North West) slipped through Parliament virtually
unnoticed in 1971, while conservationists were preoccupied with Lake
Pedder. Nevertheless, the Pedder experience ensured that there was extreme vigilance in the conservationist camp in the late 1970s, with battle
lines clearly drawn and a close watch being kept for further HEC plans
for the South West. The Tasmanian Wilderness Society, the main protagonist in the later struggle, was formed in the wake of the Pedder battle
in 1975. The legacy of the Lake Pedder struggle set the scene for the
subsequent Franklin conflict in another way. In November 1975, the state
Minister for National Parks appointed a South West advisory Committee
to look at the region, and this body focused attention on values in the
region other than hydro-electricity. In 1978 in its final report, this committee recommended extensive national parks in the South West, with
some development to be permitted in "conservation zones."
The plans the HEC had for the South West were tabled in Parliament
in October 1979, 9 and contained a recommendation for a so-called "Integrated" hydro-electric scheme which involved a dam on the Lower
Gordon River below its confluence with the Franklin, to be followed
subsequently by a dam on the middle Franklin through which would be
diverted the waters of the King River from a neighboring catchment.
While the Gordon Below Franklin scheme, with an annual energy output
of 172 MWav (average load in megawatts),"0 was small by world standards, it was significant in the Tasmanian context, because total demand
in the state was then slightly less than 1,000 MWav. The report canvassed
a number of alternative proposals, the most important being a 2 x 200
MW coal-fired thermal station and the so-called "Separate" hydro-electric
development (which involved a dam on the Gordon River above its con8. For an overview of the history of conflict over the South West, see Davis, The Strugglefor
South West Tasmania, in INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC POLICY; CASES FROM THE AUSTRALIAN STATES
(R. Scott ed. 1980).
9. HYDRO-ELECTRIC COMM'N, REPORT ON THE GORDON RIVER POWER DEVELOPMENT STAGE Two
(1979).
10. With subsequent investigation, the output of the Gordon Below Franklin was increased to
181 MWav. The expression "MWav" is a convenient way of expressing the output of a hydroelectric scheme; it refers to the average load (in megawatts) the generating plant can meet throughout
a year under average streamflow conditions.
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fluence with the Olga River, to be followed by a dam and power station
on the King River through which the waters of the Franklin would subsequently be diverted). The report, which also examined electricity demand and the social and environmental impacts of the main contending
schemes, represented an improvement over previous HEC reports, largely
because the Premier, Mr. Doug Lowe, had told the HEC in 1978 that it
should not regard approval for its preferred scheme as certain.
After the release of the report the Premier established a Coordinating
Committee on Electric Power Development to receive the public response
to the HEC document, which, he hoped, would then be considered by a
joint Select Committee of both houses of the Tasmanian Parliament.
Another report from the National Parks and Wildlife Service recommended the declaration of a wild rivers national park in the area affected
by both hydro schemes proposed. Development and conservation interests
were thus set on a collision course.
One impediment to attempts to avoid or resolve the looming conflict
was the independent status of the HEC, and the extremely attenuated
degree of accountability which existed. This was a problem which the
Lowe government had sought to counter in 1978 by proposing to place
the HEC under ministerial control; the HEC opposed this move, and was
supported by the Legislative Council. The compromise adopted was to
establish (in early 1979) the position of Director of Energy and an Energy
Policy Unit within the Premier's Department. The HEC resented this
alternative source of policy advice, but appeared to accept its existence.
In May 1980 the Coordinating Committee released its report, in which
it recommended construction of a thermal station, followed subsequently
by the Gordon Above Olga which had formed the first part of the nonpreferred Separate Development. The Committee reached this conclusion
primarily on the grounds that it expected load growth to be faster than
that forecast by the HEC (due to greater industrial expansion); the long
lead time of either of the two hydro proposals ruled them out as being
unable to be commissioned soon enough to meet this demand.
Both conservation groups and pro-hydro groups had made submissions
to the Coordinating Committee but, with it becoming apparent that the
HEC might not get its own way, the pro-hydro interests began to organize
on a scale never before seen. In April 1980, at the instigation of the
Tasmanian Chamber of Industries, the thirteen major bulk consumers
formed a group to seek support for the HEC's preferred option. Soon
after the release of the Coordinating Committee's report, a group representing HEC employees, the Hydro Employees Action Team (HEAT),
was formed to protect the jobs of those employed in hydro construction.
The relationships between this group, the HEC, and the bulk industrial
users were not entirely clear, but HEAT enjoyed at least the tacit approval
of the HEC, because employees were forbidden by law from making any
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public statements concerning HEC affairs without the consent of the
Commissioner.
The Government also came under pressure from the union-dominated

organizational wing of the Labour Party, with an unsuccessful attempt to
bind it to the HEC preferred Gordon Below Franklin scheme occurring
at the meeting of the party's State Council on July 5 and 6, just prior to
Cabinet consideration of the matter." The alignment of political forces
in favor of the HEC therefore included the industrial consumers who
benefited from any oversupply of electricity by being able to purchase
the surplus at cheap rates and unions whose members relied on hydro
construction for employment. This alignment of capital and labor is not
too unusual with "pork barrel" or distributive policies, but like many
such issues in the environmental age, the conflict was socialized and this
coalition ran into concerted opposition from the conservation movement.
The issue grew into one which could be regarded as redistributive, because
it eventually embroiled the whole of Tasmanian society. The problem was
that the political system was one involving disciplined, responsible parties, but the parties were organized around the traditional Left-Right
conflict between haves and have-nots and proved inadequate to cope when
this new conflict displaced questions of distributive justice. 2
The Cabinet met to consider the issue on July 8, 1980 and took the
unusual step of inviting both the HEC (together with the Secretary of the
Premier's Department and an officer from the Energy Policy Unit) and
Dr. Bob Brown, Director of the Tasmanian Wilderness Society to address
it. Lowe has since disclosed that he outlined the following five options
to the meeting:
1. The Integrated Development recommended by the HEC.
2. The Gordon Below Franklin followed by smaller hydro schemes
outside the catchment of the Gordon and Franklin rivers.
3. A thermal/hydro development program consisting of a 1 x 200 MW
station followed by the Gordon Above Olga and then smaller hydro
as the need arose.
4. An all thermal development program.
5. The Gordon Above Olga followed by smaller hydro schemes outside
the South West wilderness area. 3
Lowe recalls that options one (integrated development) and four (all
For a description of the machinations within the Labour Party and a history of the ALP in
11,
Tasmania, see R. DAVIS, EIGHTY YEARS' LABOR (1983).
12. 1have discussed these aspects of Theodore Lowi's theory of policy types in Kellow, Political
Science and Political Theory, 16 PoLITICs 33 (1981), and examined its implications for the functioning

of the policy process in Westminster systems of government using cases of environmental policy in
Kellow, The Policy Roles of Bureaucrats and Politicians in New Zealand, 19 PoLmcs 43 (1984).
See also Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory, 16 WORLD

POL. 677 (1972).
13. D. LOWE,

THE PRICE OF POWER

114-16 (1984).
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thermal) were ruled out at an early stage of the twelve hours of deliberations which occurred that day, and the HEC briefing convinced the
Cabinet that option three (coal-fired thermal) was likely to be less economically viable than the other suggested hydro options. What is clear
from Lowe's memoirs is that employment was ultimately the deciding
factor-which is understandable given that much of the pressure on his
government was coming from trade union sources. When the HEC admitted that the Gordon Above Olga would provide more jobs during
construction than would the Gordon Below Franklin, Lowe believed he
had found the compromise that would ensure employment while limiting
damage to the South West wilderness.
The Cabinet adopted a package of proposals which included construction of the Gordon Above Olga, an energy conservation strategy, development of the coal industry (including oil to coal and electricity to coal
conversions in industry), a review of electricity pricing policy, establishment of a Wild Rivers National Park on boundaries that would allow
construction of the Gordon Above Olga, and conversion of the Bell Bay
oil fired power station to coal. This last measure had been recommended
by the HEC in an interim report produced in June 1980, just prior to the
Cabinet deliberations. The HEC managed to have the conversion of its
only thermal station at Bell Bay considered at the same time as, but as
a separate issue from, the issue of the next new power development
program. This was a considerable coup by the HEC in defining the
alternatives for the politicians, who at no time were presented with information about an important option: the construction of a new thermal
station as a replacement for oil-fired generation at Bell Bay and as a
means of meeting the next increment of load growth. The economics of
this option compared favorably with hydro and the option had the added
advantage of providing flexibility to meet low or high load growth more
cheaply because it involved a higher proportion of variable costs."4
While initially regarding these proposals favorably, the Wilderness
Society soon decided to hold firm against any further hydro-electric development in the South West. The HEC issued a news release shortly
after the government decision to proceed with the Olga was announced.
Pointing out the shortcomings of the decision, the HEC stated that it
would operate within the constraints to ensure the best possible result.
But the constraints on the HEC were minimal, and it still regarded "the
best possible result" as being approval for the construction of the Gordon
Below Franklin. As Premier Lowe later lamented, the Chief Commissioner of the HEC, Mr. Ashton, regarded it as not only proper but as his
14. See Kellow, A Neglected Option in Tasmania's Power Debate, 14 SEARcH 306 passim (1983/

84).

Winter 1989]

FRANKLIN RIVER AND SOUTHWEST WILDERNESS AREA

137

duty to lobby the upper house to convince it to correct the government's
"mistake." The Legislative Council had appointed a Select Committee
to consider the issue, and the HEC provided it and the public with much
information and argument in favor of its preferred option, including (during October 1980) material which conflicted with the government decision
to review pricing policies; any price increase would, of course, lead to
slower demand growth. The HEC continued to base its analyses upon
load forecasts which took no account of the announced conservation and
coal substitution policies, and even made claims that there would be
difficulties in finding finance for the Olga scheme.
Lowe's relationship with Commissioner Ashton by this stage had deteriorated to the point where most communication between the two occurred in writing. The HEC was not giving the Premier the courtesy of
prior notification of its activities in lobbying the Legislative Council and
Lowe only heard indirectly that the HEC was preparing a report for the
Select Committee on the effects of a decision to forego the potential of
the Franklin. Even more ominous was the fact that the Liberal opposition
(long the sole source of any political questioning of the HEC's activities)
was beginning to exploit the widening gap between the government and
the HEC, using the power of the Legislative Council and the opposition
to the government scheme among the non-Labour majority of independent
members, many of whom had past Liberal party affiliations."-' The allies
of the HEC and the Liberal Party were linked in a new pressure group
formed just after the government decision, so that the HEC was effectively
closer to the opponents of the government than it was to the government
itself, and Premier Lowe later recounted that he often found himself in
the position of having material unknown to him or just presented to the
government in the hands of the opponents of the government's policy.
Matters really began to heat up after the Bill authorizing the Gordon
Above Olga scheme was introduced on November 13, 1980. Satisfactory
progress through the government controlled House of Assembly occurred
(as expected), but the concerted opposition lay in the upper house. An
opinion poll taken at this time revealed that 56 percent of the population
supported the government decision while only 30 percent were opposed,
but the Legislative Council, elected on very undemocratic boundaries,
was well insulated from the winds of popular opinion. The report of the
Legislative Council select committee, which favored the Gordon Below
Franklin by five votes to two, was tabled on December 11. Opinion in
the upper house was clearly against the Olga and for the Franklin scheme,
and this meant the government was in trouble because the Legislative
15. For a description of the Tasmanian political system, see W. TOWNSLEY, THE GOVERNMENT
(1976).
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Council in Tasmania is one of the most powerful upper chambers known.
(It can force the government to the polls by denying supply, but can never
itself be dissolved, and is elected with staggered six year terms; three
members stand for election for each of five years and four in the sixth
to make up the nineteen members. The will of the electorate as a whole
can never be reflected in the composition of the Council, which remains
a conservative bastion.)
The action of the Council in considering the Olga Bill was unprecedented. The details of the scheme being approved were contained in a
schedule to a Bill and the government leader in the upper house got wind
of the fact that the chairman of the Select Committee intended to move
an amendment substituting details of the Franklin scheme for the Olga
scheme in the schedule. Such a motion was not admissible because it
constituted a negativing of the intent of the Bill. A ruling to this effect
was given by the President of the Council, but the Committee Chairman
put a motion dissenting from the President's ruling, a motion which was
supported by thirteen members (a majority). This was the first time in
the history of the Council that a considered ruling by a President had
been overturned. The amendment was thus put and carried, and the
resulting deadlock could not be resolved by the ensuing conference of
managers of the two houses.
The two houses of Parliament remained deadlocked for the remainder
of 1981, but several significant events occurred during the stalemate.
Firstly, in February 1981 important archeological discoveries were made
in Kutakina Cave in an area of the Franklin catchment which would be
flooded by the Gordon Below Franklin dam. This site contained important
evidence indicating human habitation had occurred in the area much
earlier than previously thought to be the case, and this gave a specific
focus to the claims that the South West was of special scientific significance. This discovery reinforced the declaration of the Wild Rivers National Park on April 30, 1981, " and strengthened the basis for a nomination
by the state government in August 1981 of most of the South West for
inclusion on the UNESCO World Heritage List. The nomination for World
Heritage listing was forwarded by the Commonwealth government in
January 1982 and was to form the basis for Commonwealth intervention
under the external affairs power a little over a year later.
While the discoveries in Kutakina Cave and the nomination for World
Heritage listing would ultimately strengthen the hand of the Commonwealth, the position of the state government was being undermined from
within. While Premier Lowe decided to tough it out in the face of the
Parliamentary deadlock, his government began to crack under the strain.
16. The Park was proclaimed under the National Parks and Wildlife Act, No. 4 (Tas. 1970).
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During 1981, Lowe continued to face opposition from trade union elements in the Labour Party and, encouraged by this, Harry Holgate challenged for the leadership in June 1981. Holgate lost by thirteen votes to
eight among the Parliamentary Labour Party, but the pressure on Lowe's
leadership continued at the State Council meeting of the Labour Party on
July 4, when the Parliamentary party was virtually instructed by the party
machine to resolve the issue by means of a referendum. The party nevertheless did not support wholly the factions favoring a capitulation to the
HEC and, having survived the State Council meeting relatively intact,
Lowe reshuffled his Cabinet on July 7, demoting the challenger Holgate
and promoting some of those who had been loyal.
The Labour Party caucus decided on September 16 both to adhere to
its earlier decision to build the Olga scheme and preserve the Franklin
River (though now only by the narrowest margin of twelve votes to ten),
and that the matter should be decided by a referendum. This latter decision
was carried by seventeen votes to five. While the Parliamentary Labour
Party had not envisaged (nor considered) that a "No Dams" option would
be included on the ballot paper, Lowe told a press conference that he
believed that when the Cabinet decided the precise form of the ballot it
would be a genuine exercise in democracy and a No Dams option would
be included. Holgate and others in the faction opposed to Lowe (which
included the Hydro unions) claimed that this was a misrepresentation of
the Parliamentary Labour Party decision, and a Cabinet meeting the next
day decided that there would be no No Dams option. This decision was
a harbinger of doom for Lowe's premiership, and he fell on November
11, 1981, to be replaced by Holgate. Lowe resigned from the Labour
Party and sat on the cross-benches in the House as an independent, and
was followed the next week by government whip Mary Willey. This cost
the government its majority in the House of Assembly, so that it could
be defeated and forced to the polls if it lost a confidence motion.
The referendum, without a No Dams option, was held on December
12, 1981. Only three members of the Cabinet campaigned for the Olga
scheme with any conviction; the HEC and its allies mounted a strong
campaign for the Franklin dam, while the Wilderness Society urged voters
to spoil their ballot papers with a write-in No Dams vote. Of the votes
cast in the referendum, 47 percent were for the Gordon Below Franklin,
8 percent for the Olga, and an incredible 45 percent were informal (with
33 percent being marked with No Dams).' 7 Because the result (on the
basis of legitimate votes cast) favored an option counter to official government policy, Premier Holgate sought from the Governor and was
17. See Newman, Tasmanian Referenda Since Federation, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION
INTO THE CONSTITUTION AcT 1934, app. T (1982) (Hobart, Tas.).
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granted a prorogation of Parliament until March 26, 1982. When Parliament reconvened, however, the Holgate government fell, failing to survive the first day of the session. An election was set for May 26, 1982,
and, when the poll was held, the Liberal opposition was swept to power
in a landslide after promising to authorize the Gordon Below Franklin."
There was by this stage no difference between the two parties-both
promised to build the dam--but the Labour Party had by now lost all
credibility. Conservative pro-dam working class voters combined with
traditional Liberal voters to return the first Liberal government ever to
govern in its own right. 9 Upon election, the Gray Liberal government
secured legislation authorizing the Franklin dam.
The controversy had, however, transcended Tasmanian state politics
by this stage, because the conservation movement had succeeded in making the preservation of the Franklin a national issue. One immediate
success for this campaign was that the Commonwealth Senate had in
September 1981 appointed a Select Committee to enquire into the matter. 20
What was not clear was whether the Commonwealth had any constitutional power it could exercise to intervene in a manner which would be
any more effective than had proved the case over Lake Pedder (should
it indeed decide to act). The Constitution gave power over land-based
resources to the states, but the power of the Commonwealth to act under
the external affairs power of the Constitution was enhanced by the decision
in Koowarta vs. Bjelke-Petersen in May 1982.21 Meanwhile, preliminary
work on the construction of the Gordon Below Franklin commenced.
The Fraser (Liberal) government was reluctant to act against the Gray
government, despite strong pressure to do so coming from supporters of
all parties on the mainland and the release of the report of the Senate
Select Committee in November 1982, a report finding that'likely slower
demand growth would permit a moratorium on any power development
in the South West for three years.22 Nevertheless, the Western Tasmanian
Wilderness National Parks (drawn up on boundaries that would permit
18. See Smith, The Tasmanian House of Assembly Elections, 1982, 17 POLITICS 81 (1982).
19. The Liberal Party held office as a minority government from 1969 to 1972 with the support
of a minor party.
20. In recent years no party has controlled the Australian Senate, and the balance of power has
been held by the Australian Democrats, who have won enough support to win seats in the multimember, state-based electorates at least partly on the basis of their stand on environmental issues.
In this case, the establishment of a Select Committee was guaranteed by the support of the Democrats
and the Labour Party (then in opposition), but the move drew considerable support from the government ranks as well.
21. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 56 A.L.J.R. 625 (1982). The legal aspects of the case are
covered in THE SOUTH WEST DAM DISPUTE: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES (M. Somorajah ed.
1983) (Univ. of Tasmania, Hobart).

22. SENATE SELECT COMM'N ON SOUTH WEST TAS., REPORT ON DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF
FOR TASMANIA AND OTHER MATTERS (Nov. 1982) (Austl. Gov't Printing Serv.).
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construction of the Olga scheme but not the Franklin) were included on
the World Heritage List on December 14, 1982. This gave the Commonwealth constitutional power to act under the external affairs power
of the Constitution, but this power had only been clarified by the Koowarta
decision over aboriginal affairs in May 1982 and there was thus a degree
of uncertainty over whether it would apply to environmental matters in
general, and Australia's obligations under the World Heritage Convention
in particular. Prime Minister Fraser, being an avowed supporter of both
the environment and state's rights was caught in something of a cleft
stick.
The Wilderness Society had successfully extended its support beyond
the shores of Tasmania in an attempt to make the fate of the Franklin a
national electoral issue. An early example of the success of this campaign
came in elections for the House of Assembly of the Australian Capital
Territory in May 1982 and in a by-election for the federal seat of Flinders
in Victoria in December 1982; in both cases the Wilderness Society
campaigned for a No Dams write-in and succeeded in both cases in
persuading about 40 percent of voters to express their opposition by
marking their ballot papers in this way. This success encouraged the
formation of a National South West Coalition which could claim the
support of 500,000 voters nationally. Despite these events, Fraser refused
to intervene to stop the dam, but neither did he prevent the World Heritage
nomination from proceeding.
The National South West Coalition mounted a very newsworthy blockade against the construction of the dam over the Christmas-New Year
period of 1982-83, taking advantage of both the good weather and the
traditional Parliamentary recess to provide a thankful news media with
interesting copy. The carefully managed blockade did little to halt work
on the dam site but kept the issue to the fore with a succession of daily
arrests, including the Wilderness Society leader Bob Brown and international botanical personality David Bellamy. The Commonwealth government chose simply to try to defuse the issue at the federal level by
offering Tasmania compensation (to the tune of $500 million') if it declined to build the dam. Mr. Fraser then called an early election for March
5, 1983. As had been the case with Pedder, carrots proved insufficient
and, with the Labour Party at the federal level being opposed to the dam,
the Australian voter was presented with a clear choice.
The Hawke Labour government was elected in the March 5 poll, having
23. This sum consisted of the cost of a coal-fired station plus a fuel subsidy for 25 years. It
amounted to less than $500 million in present value terms and included a hedge in favor of the
Commonwealth if demand growth was less than the HEC had forecast.
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promised to halt the dam. While the wilderness lobby campaigned hard
in marginal electorates, the impact of the single-issue campaign has been
estimated at only about 1 percent of the 3.6 percent swing to the ALP. 4
Nevertheless the incoming Hawke government perceived that it owed an
obligation to these voters and it discharged this obligation by passing
(with the aid of the Democrats in the Senate) the World Heritage Properties
Conservation Act 1983. The validity of this legislation was confirmed in
the ensuing litigation, with the High Court decision being handed down
on July 1, 1983. Although it was not legally obliged to do so, the Commonwealth subsequently provided Tasmania with compensation totaling
about $290 million.
Wilderness Values and the Policy Process
Throughout the conflict over the Gordon Below Franklin dam, the
quality of the information available to policymakers and the public alike
left much to be desired. The project analyses prepared by the HEC included a number of assumptions which favored its preferred scheme over
other options.' In a political climate that favored development over conservation, it was not surprising that less-than-rigorous demand forecasts
were produced and the inputs into the project (particularly jobs) were
regarded as benefits. Our main concern here, however, is with the failure
to incorporate wilderness values into the policy process, so that the seemingly "objective" analyses of costs and benefits associated with the project
and the alternative projects all ignored the destruction of wilderness which,
certainly judging by the political response, was valued highly by many
people both within Tasmania and on the Australian mainland.
Although a draft environmental impact statement was prepared along
with its 1979 Report, the HEC made no attempt to value the cost of
wilderness loss in its appraisals of power development program. In mitigation, it must be pointed out that the HEC was only required by law
to undertake narrow financial analyses of direct money costs in reporting
to Parliament. Such an approach, however, assumed that Parliament would
vest in the HEC without charge the right to dam rivers and use land in
order to construct a hydro-electric scheme.26 Such an evaluation was not
an inadequate basis for decisions by politicians about whether to give
these rights to the HEC. The problem for the politicians lay in establishing--even approximately-how much society would be willing to pay
to preserve a wilderness area. A number of techniques have been devel24. Warhurst, Single-Issue Politics: The Impact of Conservation and Anti-abortion Groups, 60
CURRENT AFF. BULL. 19 passim (July 1983).
25. See Kellow, Public Project Evaluation in an Australian State: Tasmania's Dam Controversy,
55 AUSTL. Q. 263 passim (1983).
26. The HEC does not have to pay water rents, as do many hydro-electric utilities elsewhere.
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oped by economists and one of these, the derivation of a threshold value
for wilderness which would make the cost of two alternatives equal,27
was employed by a team from the Australian National University headed
by Hugh Saddler." After performing an analysis which used HEC cost
estimates they derived a threshold value of about $700,000 at a 5 percent
discount rate and about $150,000 at a 10 percent discount rate. These
figures corresponded to the present annual benefit from wilderness preservation which (on HEC cost estimates) would make the present value
of the full Integrated Hydro Development and Thermal Development
programs equal. The analysts left it to the politicians to decide whether
wilderness benefits exceeded these thresholds, but, pointing to a survey
showing that 75,000 visitors to Tasmania stated wilderness-related attractions as a reason for their visit, suggested implicitly that the threshold
was exceeded on values related to tourism alone.
The political process is one means of correcting for market failures,
but it too has its limitations, relating particularly the imprecise transmission of preferences via both electoral and interest group politics and a
well-established tendency for voters to understate their preferences for
public goods (including environmental goods).29 The inexactitude stems
from the fact that voters usually vote on bundles of issues rather than
express their preferences on single issues, but in this case a referendum
was held on this single issue, so an estimate of the social valuation of
wilderness can be gauged-at least as at the time of the referendum in
December 1981. The referendum results provide a rare opportunity to
assess willingness to pay for wilderness, because (unlike opinion surveys
which ask people to state willingness to pay) those voting in the referendum would have accepted that they had to live with the consequences
of their "valuations."
We know from the votes cast that eight percent of Tasmanians thought
the preservation of Franklin River was worth at least the additional cost
of the Gordon Above Olga, and that a third of voters thought it worth at
least the extra cost of a coal-fired thermal station (implicit in a No Dams
vote). If we were to assume that the public accepted the HEC cost estimates, were aware of the cost differences, and were capable of performing a rough present value calculation, we can put at least a ballpark
estimate on the willingness of Tasmanian society at this time to pay to
preserve the Franklin River. Even at this time, with support for the Gordon
27. Krutilia & Cicchetti, Evaluating Benefits ofEnvironmentalResources with SpecialApplication
to Hell's Canyon, 12 NAT RES. J. I passim (1972).
28. H. SADDLER, J. BENNETT, I. REYNOLDS & B. SMITH, PUBLIC CHOICE IN TASMANIA passim
(1980).
29. This, of course, is because of the problem of the free rider, discussed at length in M. OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
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Above Olga at rock bottom among those who favored some hydro development, the sum bidded in the referendum exceeded the difference in
cost between the Gordon Above Olga and the Gordon Below Franklin. 30
Had this valuation of wilderness to be destroyed been included in the
HEC cost estimate for the Gordon Below Franklin, the Gordon Above
Olga would have been preferred on economic grounds. Interestingly, this
suggests that there are problems with attempting to decide such issues
by means of referenda, and that the valuation of wilderness implicit in
the Lowe government's Gordon Above Olga compromise---derived by
inexact political means-was probably an accurate reflection of Tasmanian society's willingness to pay for wilderness preservation. 3
The failure by policymakers to make explicit any valuation of wilderness was an omission which quite clearly contributed greatly to the divisive conflict over the Gordon Below Franklin. The research by Saddler
et al. for the National Parks and Wildlife Service32 and a multi-objective
planning exercise prepared by Professor John Burton (chairman of the
earlier Commonwealth inquiry into the flooding of Lake Pedder) for the
Directorate of Energy 33 constituted the only attempts by government agencies to overcome this deficiency, and, while they appear to have influenced
the decision of the former Lowe government to opt for the Gordon Above
Olga scheme, these analysts were not treated with anything like the
reverence accorded to the HEC's financial analyses.
This shortcoming was exacerbated because Tasmania had already made
an implicit valuation of the externalities involved with a thermal option
by the adoption of the Environment Protection Act 1973. This law made
necessary additional direct financial costs in the case of a thermal stationa higher exit stack than would otherwise be necessary, electrostatic precipitators, cooling towers, and ash disposal being the major cost items.
This inconsistent treatment of environmental costs which did not appear
30. See Kellow, Poitics. Economics and Non-Market Items, 47 AUSTRALIAN FORESTRY 148, 151
(1984). The present value difference between the two hydro schemes can be taken as $38.8 million
and that between the Gordon Below Franklin and thermal development programs at $150.1 million.
Weighting these values according to the votes cast gives a revealed valuation of wilderness of $52.6
million ([0.08 x $38.8m] + [0.33 x $150.1m])-just enough to justify the extra cost of the
Gordon Above Olga. This result holds regardless of how one interprets almost 24,000 votes which
were declared invalid.
31. One is reminded by this divergence between voting preferences and willingness to pay of the
paradox of voting. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
32. See H. Saddler, J. Bennett, I. Reynolds & B. Smith, supra note 28. Somewhat curiously,
national parks in Australia are a concern of state governments (a legacy of their dominion over landbased resources under the constitution), so the National Parks and Wildlife Service was a state
government agency.
33. J. Burton, Proposals for Future Power Development in Tasmania, (1981) (unpublished report
for the Tasmania Directorate of Energy).
34. Environment Protection Act, No. 34 (Tas. 1973).
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as costs in the market perhaps best explains the failure of the Tasmanian
political system to settle the issue with minimal conflict.
CONCLUSION: THE SPOILS OF VICTORY
While the South West wilderness area has been preserved, one consequence of the victory for environmentalists has been that a government
which has minimal regard for environmental values was entrenched in
Tasmania. The fiercely parochial Gray Liberal government was swept to
power in 1982 and re-elected in 1986 largely because of the way in which
voters saw it as supporting the HEC throughout and standing up to Canberra. It has subsequently won a victory against the environmentalists on
the issue of export woodchipping and has continued a confrontationist
approach to the Commonwealth government. While this situation will
not persist forever, there is ample opportunity for the Tasmanian government to do considerable damage to wilderness areas outside the World
Heritage area. This result has been part of the costs of winning a total
victory with regard to the South West, but only by means of Commonwealth intervention.
The environmental movement was offered a compromise early on in
the debate over the Franklin. The Lowe government decided on a compromise which included the Gordon Above Olga, and thus limited destruction at the margins of the wilderness area. The Bill authorizing the
Gordon Above Olga was blocked by the Legislative Council, but support
for this compromise was not forthcoming from the environmental movement and both Premier Lowe and the Olga scheme had been thoroughly
undermined by the time the referendum to resolve the Parliamentary
deadlock was held. What might the result have been if the environmental
movement had moved its support fully behind the Olga option? It is
arguable that the Olga might have carried the day on the referendumopinion polls certainly indicated considerable support for the government's stance in early 1981. Would Legislative Council and HEC intransigence continued in the face of a popular mandate for the Olga? The
result might have been the Olga (with a small encroachment on the South
West), but also the continuation in office of a government that was more
sensitive to environmental issues than any before or since in Tasmania.
Moreover, while the preservation of the Franklin was, indeed, an impressive victory, it must be borne in mind just how fortunate the Franklin
decision was. It is highly doubtful whether the incoming Hawke Commonwealth government would have been bold enough to take on the
Tasmanian government on such an important issue unless it was confident
of winning (especially so early in its term of office). Otherwise it is likely
the Hawke government would have treated the issue in much the same
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way as its Fraser government predecessor-with a token gesture (once
elected) and a plea that it had done all in its power to prevent the Tasmanian folly. Without the previous decision in Koowarta confirming an
extension of the external affairs power, it is highly unlikely that the Hawke
government would have taken such decisive action. Additionally, of course,
it must be remembered that Fraser called the March 1983 election early.
The additional damage the HEC would have been able to cause to the
South West in an additional year might have made the area not worth
saving.
Federal action to save the Franklin was not, therefore, guaranteed (nor
guaranteed to succeed) at the time the Wilderness Society declined to
support the Lowe government's Gordon Above Olga compromise in mid1980. There had been no decision in the Koowarta case. Malcolm Fraser
was still Prime Minister, the archeological find in Kutakina cave had not
been made, and the hope of Commonwealth salvation was slender indeed.
The environmental movement essentially gambled for all the remaining
South West wilderness or nothing. The fact that it won should not be
allowed to obscure the fact that it was a near-run thing and that the odds
in favor of this result at the time the bridge of compromise was burned
were very long indeed.
This underscores two points. The first is that successful campaigns to
preserve wilderness sometimes require boldness if objectives are to be
achieved. The other point to stress is that political campaigns based upon
such brinkmanship are extremely high-risk undertakings, sometimes involving long term costs which must be balanced against immediate victories. But then, as Lord Keynes once remarked, in the long run we are
all dead-and so is the wilderness. It is difficult for those seeking to
preserve wilderness areas to compromise without accepting a slow, gradual nibbling away at the margins-a death of a thousand cuts.
The policy process often relies upon compromise for its smooth functioning. This case draws attention to the fact that wilderness preservation
issues can unleash powerful forces in society, that compromises are not
readily found and that existing political institutions are likely to be found
wanting. If the wilderness areas remaining in the world are to be protected,
means will have to be found of incorporating wilderness values into the
earliest stages of decisionmaking. Because of the political imperatives in
favor of development, that calls for something akin to a paradigm shift
in society. The Franklin victory, despite its immediate consequences at
the state level, can be seen as having helped start that process at the
national level in Australia.

